Motivated by cryptographic applications, we study subgroups of braid groups Bn generated by a small number of random elements of relatively small lengths compared to n. Our experiments show that "most" of these subgroups are equal to the whole Bn, and "almost all" of these subgroups are generated by positive braid words. We discuss the impact of these experimental results on the security of the Anshel-Anshel-Goldfeld key exchange protocol [2] with originally suggested parameters as well as with recently updated ones.
Introduction
Braid group cryptography has attracted a lot of attention recently due to several suggested key exchange protocols (see [2] , [11] ) using braid groups as a platform. We refer to [3] , [5] for more information on braid groups.
Here we start out by giving a brief description of the Anshel-Anshel-Goldfeld key exchange protocol [2] (subsequently called the AAG protocol) to explain our motivation.
Let B n be the group of braids on n strands and X n = {x 1 , . . . , x n−1 } the set of standard generators. Thus, B n = x 1 , . . . , x n−1 ; x i x i+1 x i = x i+1 x i x i+1 , x i x j = x j x i for |i − j| > 1 .
and L ∈ N be preset parameters. The AAG protocol [2] is the following sequence of steps: AB of the group B n . This K is now their common secret key.
Note that for an intruder to get the common secret key K, it is sufficient to find any element C = a τ1 r1 . . . a τm rm such that b = C −1 bC in the group B n (see e.g. [11] , [15] ). Finding such an element is an instance of the following problem (call it subgroup-restricted conjugacy search problem for future reference):
Let G be a group, A a subgroup of G generated by some {a 1 , . . . a r }, and Without the restriction x ∈ A, this would be a well-known (multiple simultaneous) conjugacy search problem. While the latter problem for braid groups is not known to have polynomial-time solution, some important recently made inroads [7] , [12] suggest that it may be solved quite efficiently by a deterministic algorithm for at least some inputs, e.g. if one of the tuples g or h consists of positive braid words only. Thus, having the above subgroup A ≤ B n significantly different from B n should be important for the security of the AAG protocol.
In the present paper, we experimentally show that the parameters
for the AAG protocol suggested in [1] may not provide sufficient level of security because the relevant subgroup A ≤ B n is either the whole B n or is "very close" to the whole B n .
More specifically, out of 100 experiments that we performed, a randomly selected tuple a = (a 1 , . . . , a N1 ) with parameters as above (see our Section 5 for details on producing random tuples) generated the whole group B n in 63 experiments. In the remaining 37 experiments, the subgroups were "close" to the whole group B n , and in 36 of them, the subgroups were generated by positive braid words. See Section 4 for more details.
Similar results were obtained in [9] using homomorphisms of braid groups onto permutation groups. In this paper we go further and extend these results to recently suggested greater parameter values; this is discussed later in this section. Our approach to cryptanalysis of the AAG protocol (we call it the "subgroup attack") is rather general and can be used in cryptanalysis of commutator key exchange schemes based on other groups.
In the AAG protocol, there are two subgroups a = (a 1 , . . . , a N1 ) and b = (b 1 , . . . , b N2 ) each of which is generated independently of the other. The following procedure can be used to attack the AAG protocol:
(1) Given two tuples a and b, simplify them using the procedure(s) in our Section 3.
(2) Both simplified tuples will consist of positive braid words with probability 98% (99% each), see the list in the beginning of our Section 4. In that case, the corresponding multiple simultaneous conjugacy search problem can be efficiently solved by the method of [12] (using super summit sets).
(3) With probability 98% (99% each), the centralizer of Alice's and Bob's subgroup coincides with the center of B n . Therefore, any solution of the multiple simultaneous conjugacy search problem obtained by using, say, the method of [12] mentioned above, will differ from the actual Alice's (Bob's) private key by a factor lying in the center of B n . This will yield the correct common secret key K because K is the commutator K = A −1 B −1 AB, and therefore its value does not change if either A or B or both are multiplied by elements from the center of the ambient group B n . Thus, one does not have to solve the subgroup-restricted conjugacy search problem in this case.
The above claim that the centralizer of any subgroup (except the last one) on the list in the beginning of Section 4 coincides with the center of B n , follows from the following fact: any element in the group B n that commutes with x k i for some positive k, also commutes with x i . This, in turn, follows from the results of [8] .
Thus, it appears that with probability at least 98% · 98% ≈ 96%, the AAG protocol (with parameters as in [1] ) can be successfully attacked by the procedure outlined above.
We note that by increasing the crucial parameters L 1 and L 2 (and therefore increasing the lengths of the private keys), it is probably possible to downsize the relevant subgroup so that the method of [12] would not work. However, for public sets with longer elements, length-based attacks, as described in [6] , [9] , [10] , may become a threat, although it seems that the existing experimental base is insufficient to draw any definitive conclusions on using longer keys in the AAG protocol.
Another possible way of improving security of the AAG protocol might be increasing the rank of the ambient braid group. However, we have run similar experiments with N = 150,
and arrived at similar results: with probability at least 92%, the AAG protocol with these parameters can be successfully attacked by our procedure.
The arrangement of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we introduce some more notation and describe an algorithm from [13] producing a shorter word representing a given braid word. In Section 3, we describe a heuristic procedure which allows us to simplify a given set of generators of a subgroup in B n . In Section 4, we describe results of our experiments. In Section 5, we explain how these experimental results affect the security of the AAG protocol. Finally, in Section 5, we describe our procedure for producing random subgroup generators as in the AAG protocol.
Preliminaries
Let F (X n ) be the free group generated by X n . An element of F (X n ) is a reduced word over X ±1 n referred to as a braid word. For a braid word w = w 1 . . . w k ∈ F (X n ) we will denote by |w| its length k and by |w| Bn the length of a shortest braid word w defining the same element of B n as w does. There is no efficient way to compute |w| Bn ; in [14] the authors prove that the problem of computing a geodesic for a braid word is co-NP-complete. We will employ Algorithm 1 from [13] to obtain a shorter word representing a given braid word w; description of this algorithm is given below, for the sake of completeness. For relatively short words w considered in this paper, one almost always has |Shorten(w)| = |w| Bn (where |Shorten(w)| is the output of Algorithm 1 in [13] ; see [13] for more information). By Dehornoy's form of a braid we mean a braid word without any "handles", i.e. a completely reduced braid word in the sense of [4] . The procedure that computes Dehornoy's form for a given word chooses a specific ("permitted") handle inside of the word and removes it (see [1] or [4] ). This can introduce new handles but the main result about Dehornoy's forms states that any sequence of handle reductions eventually terminates. Of course, the result depends on how one chooses the handles at every step. Let us fix any particular strategy for selecting handles. For a word w = w(X n ) we denote by D(w) the corresponding Dehornoy's form (i.e., the result of handle reductions where handles are chosen by the fixed strategy). Now we describe Algorithm 1 from [13] . This algorithm tries to minimize a given braid word. It uses the property of Dehornoy's form that for a "generic" braid word one has |D(w)| < |w|. 
Subgroup Simplification
In this section we describe a heuristic procedure which allows us to simplify a given set of generators of a subgroup in B n .
Reducing Generating Sets
Let S be a set of words in the alphabet X n . We say that the set S is reduced if: 1) |w| = |w| Bn for each w ∈ S, i.e., each word from S is geodesic in B n . 2) For each pair of words u, v ∈ S and any numbers ε, δ ∈ {−1, 1}, one has
(Otherwise, the total length of elements of S can be reduced by replacing the longer of the words u, v by u ε v δ ). Let S denote the subgroup generated by S. We say that two sets S, T ⊆ B n are equivalent if S = T in B n .
The following algorithm tries to reduce a given set S, i.e., tries to find a reduced set equivalent to S. As mentioned above, the problem of finding a geodesic for a given braid word is computationally hard. Instead, we are using here the procedure Shorten (Algorithm 1 in [13] ) to minimize the length of braid words. Thus, in general, the output of Algorithm 2 may not be a reduced set of braid words, but for generating sets meeting the requirements in [1] , this is usually the case. Proof. Since each reduction decreases the total length of the generating set, the number of reductions Algorithm 2 performs is finite and limited by L(S), the total length of elements of S.
A. For each word w ∈ T , replace w with the word Shorten(w) (cf. Algorithm 1 in [13]). Remove the empty word if produced. B. For each pair of words u, v ∈ T and numbers
To prove the second statement observe that the transformations used in Algorithm 2 are Nielsen transformations; they do not change the subgroup generated by a given set.
Let (a, a ) be a pair of conjugate tuples of braid words and (z, z ) be a pair of conjugate tuples of braid words. We say that tuples (a, a ) and (z, z ) are equivalent if the following conditions hold:
Observe that from (E1), (E2), and the fact that tuples are conjugate follows that a = z . Now assume that we have two conjugate tuples a and a of braid words as in the AAG protocol. The next algorithm reduces the pair (a, a ). Proof. The transformations used in Algorithm 3 are Nielsen transformations; they do not change the subgroup generated by a given set. Hence (E1) holds. Furthermore, by transforming z i ∈ z, we transform z i ∈ z the same way. Thus, the property (E2) holds and the output (z, z ) is equivalent to the input (a, a ).
Extending Generating Sets
We say that a set S ∪ S is an extension of S. The next algorithm heuristically extends a reduced set of generators S by adding words (one at a time) of length 2 from the subgroup S , and then reduces the set. Basically, the algorithm generates words from S using a few patterns and, in case a new word has length 2, adds it to the current set and reduces the result. 
A. For each pair of words (u, v) ∈ T , and each pair of numbers
ε, δ ∈ {−1, 1}: 1) Compute w = Shorten(v 2ε u δ v −ε u −δ v −ε ) and T = Reduce(T ∪
{w}). If |w| = 2 and T = T , then put T = T . 2) Compute w = Shorten(v ε u δ ) and T = Reduce(T ∪ {w}). If |w| = 2 and T = T , then put T = T . B. When all pairs of words u, v ∈ T are handled (including the new ones),
output the current set T .
Proposition 3. Algorithm 4 terminates on any finite set S of braid words and, if T = Extend(S), then S = T .
Proof. The latter statement is obviously true by Proposition 1 and since each braid word we add to T defines an element of S . Note that Algorithm 4 extends the current set T with braid words w of length 2 only. Moreover, a word w = x Proof. Each time we extend the tuples (z, z ) with elements w, w which follows from the tuples (i.e., w ∈ z and w ∈ z ). So, now the property (E1) follows from Proposition 2. Furthermore, braid words w and w were obtained the same way. Thus, the property (E2) holds and the output (z, z ) is equivalent to the input (a, a ).
We therefore have Proof. Obvious.
The main point of Proposition 5 is that the obtained instance (y, y ) and (z, z ) of the AAG protocol is easier to break than the original (a, a ) and (b, b ). (It will be clear from the experimental results described in the next section.) Furthermore, (y, y ) and (z, z ) can be computed quite efficiently.
Experimental Results
We performed a series of 100 experiments with randomly generated subgroups of B 80 . In each experiment we 1) Generated Alice's and Bob's public and private keys a, b, A, B (as described in the Introduction). , x i+2 , . . . , x 79 ) for some i.
Thus, randomly generated tuples of braid words a and b of "AAG-type" generate either the whole B n or a subgroup which is "close" to the whole group B n .
To explain this phenomenon, consider two particular braid words in B 80 :
It is easy to check that w
8 . This happens, basically, because all generators in w 1 commute with all generators in w 2 except x 8 which does not commute with x 9 .
In general, if we pick two random braid words w 1 and w 2 (of length 5 − 8 over the alphabet {x 1 , . . . , x 79 }) in a such that w 1 contains some fixed generator x ±1 i and w 2 contains x ±1 i+1 , then there is a big chance that all other generators that occur in w 1 or w 2 commute with each other and with x i and x i+1 . In other words, for each 1 ≤ i ≤ 79, with significant probability, there are two words w 1 and w 2 such that
3. x i commutes with w 1 , w 2 , w 1 , and w 2 ; 4. x i+1 commutes with w 1 , w 2 , w 1 , and w 2 ; 5. w 1 commutes with w 2 and w 2 , and w 1 commutes with w 2 and w 2 .
In this case, for some ε, δ ∈ {−1, 1}, we have w . Finally, after sufficient number of words of length 2 is produced, the algorithm reduces the initial subgroup generators to generators of the whole group B n . Remark 1. We note that increasing the parameters L 1 and L 2 decreases the probability for pairs of words w 1 , w 2 to satisfy the properties (1)- (5) above. However, if the increase is moderate, then it is quite likely that w 1 and w 2 will contain two pairs of non-commuting generators, say, x i , x j in w 1 and x i±1 , x j±1 in w 2 . Then, for some ε, δ ∈ {−1, 1}, we have w
which is a word of length 4. In this case, performance of the algorithm 5 can be improved by allowing to add words of length 4 to the generating set (at the cost of somewhat reducing the speed of computation). As the parameter values L 1 and L 2 are increased further, the pattern w and longer words, and for some of these words the algorithm may fail to prove that the relevant subgroup is the whole group B n (sometimes the subgroup may actually be different from B n ).
We used this modification of the algorithm to test the following parameters: N = 80, N 1 = 20, N 2 = 20, and L 1 = 11, L 2 = 13. Even with the generators that long, many subgroups do generate the whole B N . As we have mentioned before, further increase of the length of the generators can make the protocol vulnerable to length-based attacks.
The Impact of the Experimental Results on the Security of the AAG Protocol
As described in the previous section, our experiments show that with the choice of parameters for the AAG protocol suggested in [1] , the subgroups generated by a and b tend to have the following properties:
(G1) They are either the whole group B n or "almost" the whole B n .
(G2) They have cyclic centralizer which coincides with the center of B n . (The latter is generated by the element Δ 2 .) (G3) They are generated by short (of length up to 3) positive braid words.
Furthermore, Algorithm 5 efficiently transforms an initial generating tuple into a simplified generating tuple of type (G1)-(G3). In this section, we explain how these results affect the security of the AAG protocol. The techniques used in this section were developed by S. J. Lee and E. Lee in [12] and by J. GonzalezMeneses in [7] . We refer the reader to these two papers for more information on the algorithms; here we just recall some notation that we need.
For a ∈ B n , the number inf(a) denotes the maximum integer k such that a = Δ k p in the group B n , where Δ ∈ B n is the half-twist braid and p is a positive braid. For an r-tuple of braids a = (a 1 , . . . , a r ), denote by C inf (S) the set of all r-tuples (b 1 , . . . , b r ) ∈ B r n such that inf(b i ) ≥ inf(a i ) (i = 1, . . . , r) and there exists w ∈ B n such that b = w −1 aw. The following algorithm combines two ingredients: the subgroup simplification algorithm of the present paper and the summit attack of [7] , [12] into one attack on Alice's (or Bob's) key. 
Computations.
A. Compute (a 1 , a 1 ) = Extend(a, a ) . B. Using technique from [12] , compute (a 2 , a 2 ), u, and v satisfying the following properties:
Using technique from [7] , compute a braid word s such that a 2 
By Theorem 2 of [12] , the step B of Algorithm 6 can be performed very efficiently (by a polynomial time algorithm). The time complexity of the step C is proportional to the size of C inf (a 1 ) which is large in general, but for all subgroups obtained in our experiments these sets were small. For instance, if the tuple a consists of all generators of B n , then |C inf (a 1 )| = 2 as shown in the next proposition.
Proof. Let c 0 ∈ B n be such that c −1
Then for each i = 1, . . . , n−1 one has c −1
Since conjugation is an automorphism, it is easy to see that either (s 1 , . . . , s n−1 ) = (1, . . . , n − 1) or (s 1 , . . . , s n−1 ) = (n − 1, . . . , 1) which proves the proposition.
For other generating tuples obtained in our experiments the sizes of the summit set C inf (x) are small, too. Therefore, we can say that Algorithm 6 is efficient on a randomly generated subgroup as described in the AAG protocol. We should mention that the obtained conjugator may not be exactly Alice's (Bob's) private key; we compute it up to the centralizer of Bob's (Alice's) subgroup. However, since in almost all examples the centralizer is generated by the element Δ 2 (i.e., coincides with the center of B n ), this is not a problem. We would like to point out that without the first step the attack may not be efficient since the size of the summit set would be huge. Now, with Algorithm 6 it is easy to find the shared key obtained by Alice and Bob in the AAG protocol:
Algorithm 7. (Attack on the AAG protocol)
Signature. w = GetSharedKey(a, a , b, b ) . Note that, in theory, Algorithm 8 might go into an infinite loop if the subgroup generators {w 1 , . . . , w k } do not involve some braid generator x i . But in real life, such a situation is extremely rare. In fact, the greatest number of iterations Algorithm 8 performed in our experiments was 5.
